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Abstract
This paper studies a principal-agent problem of moral hazard, in which the outside option
is stochastic. This renders the agent's participation decision random from the perspective of
the principal. The participation cost is no longer dened in terms of the agent's outside option
but in terms of the principal's marginal benet of participation. The optimal contract (i)
entails information rents; (ii) features a trade-o between participation probability and rents
and (iii) induces a lower eort than the standard model. Random participation results in weaker
incentives and in twofold (ex ante) welfare losses. Menus of contracts (screening mechanisms)
are not helpful to extract information because the single-crossing condition does not hold.
Keywords: moral hazard, asymmetric information, contract, participation constraint, principal-
agent. JEL Classication: D82,D86.
1 Introduction
The canonical model of moral hazard takes the agent's outside option as known to the principal
designing the incentive contract. This simplifying assumption allows the analyst to focus attention
on the incentive problem: the only friction stems from moral hazard, while participation can
always be secured. This approach has spawn a vast literature and has been successfully extended
to problems of moral hazard in teams (Holmstrom, 1982; Itoh,1993), multitasking (Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1991), hierarchies (Tirole, 1986) or even common agency (Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992;
School of Economics, UNSW. Email: g.roger@unsw.edu.au. I owe special thanks to my colleagues Richard
Holden, Chris Bidner and Suraj Prasad for most helpful comments.
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Martimort, 2004) and to countless applications. In doing so however the question of participation
has been neglected; this is neither natural nor innocuous.
It is not natural because employers likely do not know their prospective hire's outside option,
who may receive other oers from market participants. In nancial contracting, it is unlikely that
any one bank knows exactly other lenders' terms { i.e. the borrower's reservation utility. It is
not innocuous because assuming that one knows the outside option is tantamount to disregarding
information about the environment that is relevant to the optimal contract. In this paper I relax
this standard assumption and let the outside option be stochastic. This random variable can be
thought of as the reduced form of a game between principals competing for agents{say in a labor
market. Allowing for the outside option to be uncertain sheds new light on the nature of the
participation problem, which is found to interact subtly with the incentive problem.
Bar for the randomness of the outside option described by a common-knowledge distribution, the
model is a standard principal-agent problem of moral hazard. The optimal contract still bears some
of the standard properties; in particular, the transfer function is increasing in the output according
to the likelihood ratio of the distribution (Holmstrom, 1979, Rogerson, 1985b, Jewitt 1988). The
paper's central feature is a rent extraction-participation trade-o: conditional on participation,
the principal wants to limit the transfer paid to the agent, but he also must oer high-enough a
payment to secure said participation. Technically, the objective function becomes non-monotonic
concave in the transfer t, while it is monotonically decreasing in the standard problem.1 The
participation cost is thus not dened in terms of the agent's outside option, which is unknown.
Rather it is exactly given by the principal's marginal benet of securing participation, which always
(necessarily) exceeds the agent's shadow cost (the Lagrange multiplier in the standard problem).
That is, to secure participation the principal is willing to pay more (than in the standard problem)
for any eort level. This interacts with the incentive problem in that the principal internalizes the
higher cost of any given action; his preferred action is thus lower than the standard second-best.
From a social standpoint this is costly on two accounts. First, the social surplus decreases when
eort decreases. Second, with a lower action the agent's expected utility in equilibrium is also
1Put another way, any agent who accepts a contract necessarily receives an ex ante rent (except for the marginal
agent). The principal would like to extract this rent but can do so only imperfectly because the agent chooses her
action, not the principal.
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lower. Therefore the probability of participation decreases and gains from trade are lost.
With the characterization in hand two sets of comparative statics can be derived. The rst one
concerns itself with the impact of a change in the the incentive problem (i.e. distribution of output
and agent's risk aversion) on the participation probability. More dispersion of the distribution
output, or more risk aversion, both lead to a lower participation threshold. In the second set
of comparative statics I study the eects of changes in the contracting environment captured by
changes in the distribution of the outside option. A shift the distribution in the sense of rst-
order stochastic dominance unambiguously results in a lower action being induced, and therefore
in a lower participation probability. A mean-preserving spread of the same distribution has more
ambiguous consequences.
A natural question that arises is whether the principal may be made better o by using menus
of incentive contracts. Indeed a revelation mechanism may be called on to elicit the agent's private
information about her outside option. If so, the principal would essentially trade-o an information
rent (under the revelation mechanism) for another (without it). Truthful revelation of that infor-
mation can only be achieved with non-contingent transfer functions; that is, menus are useless. The
reason is that, unlike in a standard adverse selection problem, there is no direct (i.e. technology or
preferences) connection between the agent's private information (here the outside option) and her
choice of action. In technical terms, the single-crossing condition does not hold in a strong sense:
the game is not supermodular in the agent's private information.
As a by-product of the analysis, the linear contract derived by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
is shown to be a very special case. In that model the contract divorces participation from incentives.
With a stochastic outside option, this results in the slope of the linear contract, and therefore the
equilibrium action, to remain unchanged. This insight is in fact quite misleading, and unique to
the exponential specication.
This paper bears a nominal connection to a paper by Rochet and Stole (2000), who study
random outside option in the context of adverse selection. The analysis here turns out to be
simpler and has a dierent economic content. Broadly speaking I nd results that run counter to
theirs. Under adverse selection, uncertainty of the outside option lowers the probability of paying
the information rent, so distortions used to decrease that rent can be relaxed. Under moral hazard,
uncertainty of the reservation utility increases the cost of any one action, so it creates incentives
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for further distortions.
The literature on moral hazard is vast and rich. This work builds on the well-known contri-
butions of Holmstrom (1979), Rogerson (1985b) and Jewitt (1988), who study what has become
the standard moral hazard problem. Beyond that however, perhaps surprisingly, no other paper
combines moral hazard and stochastic outside option. Somewhat tangentially, this paper relates to
the work of Laont and Tirole (1986), who analyze a combination of adverse selection and moral
hazard. Their revelation mechanism has bite because the agent's private information directly aects
her payos, unlike here. Conditional on extracting that private information, the optimal action is
not distorted (conditionally rst-best). In the present model, the optimal eort is \conditionally
second-best": the distortion is indirect, as in Laont and Tirole (1986), and in response only to the
modied transfer. This study also connects to the works of Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and Jullien (2000) who investigate the role of type-dependent reserva-
tion utility in models of adverse selection. When the outside option is high enough, the interaction
of the participation constraint and the incentive constraint generates countervailing incentives that
may reverse the direction of the usual distortions. The nature of the present work is quite dierent
but it is worth noting that it is precisely the interaction of the moral hazard constraint and the
participation probability, through the transfer, that is the source of distortions.
The next Section introduces the model. In Section 3, I start with the standard model to x ideas
and conduct most of the analysis. Section 4 discusses the linear model Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) and Rochet and Stole's (2000) work. Last I conclude. All proofs are sent to the Appendix.
2 Model
A principal delegates a task to an agent. She undertakes an unobservable action a 2 A  R+. The
action yields a stochastic outcome q 2 q; q  Q  R+ with conditional distribution F (qja) and
corresponding density f(qja) > 0, at cost c(a) increasing and convex. The density f(qja) satises
the MLRP: fa(qja)=f(qja) is increasing, concave in q; therefore F (qja0) stochastically dominates
F (qja) in a rst-order sense when a0 > a. Upon a realization of q, the agent receives a transfer
t. Her net utility is given by v(t; a)  u(t)   c(a), where u : R 7! R is a continuous, increasing,
concave function. There is no limited liability constraint. Throughout the principal can commit
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to the contract and receives a net payo S(t; q) = q   t. Said contract C = ht(q); ai is an eort
recommendation a and a transfer function t : Q 7! R.
For that contract to be accepted by the agent, it must satisfy an individual rationality constraint.
The object of this paper is to study the eects of randomness at that stage of the game. The
participation decision itself is not random, of course; rather the outside option is. Specically, the
agent's outside option u0 follows a log-concave, common knowledge distribution G(u0); u0 2 U0 
[u0; u0]  R. That U0 be bounded is without consequences on the results. That outside option
is unknown to the principal; it is private to the agent when she decides whether to accept the
contract. The timing is otherwise standard:
1. The principal oers a contract C;
2. The outside option u0 is realized. It is known to the agent only;
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3. The agent accepts or rejects the contract. If rejecting, she receives her outside option and
the principal gets 0. If accepting, she also chooses an action a;
4. Action a generates an outcome q 2 Q;
5. Transfers are implemented and payos are realized.
3 Analysis
3.1 The standard problem
In the standard model, the principal's programme reads
Problem 1
max
t;a
Z
Q
[x  t(x)] dF (xja)
s.t.
a 2 argmax
a02A
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja0)  c(a0) (3.1)
and
U(t; a) 
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja)  c(a)  u0 (3.2)
2Whether stages 1 and 2 are interchanged has no bearing on the outcomes of the game.
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for some exogenous, known outside option u0. Let (a
SB; tSB) denote the solution to Problem 1.
This is a well known problem, studied under dierent angles and with dierent motivations, by
Mirrlees (1975, 1999), Holmstrom (1979), Rogerson (1985b), Jewitt (1988), Araujo and Moreira
(2001) or Conlon (2009). Typically the participation (3.2) constraint binds { except if the agent
is subject to a limited liability constraint. Jewitt (1988) and Conlon (2009) have also provided
tractable conditions for the rst-order approach (FOA) to be valid; these conditions are assumed
to hold in this paper.
3.2 Random participation
Let ~u0 be a realization of u0. When u0  G(u0), the participation constraint of the agent is satised
with probability Pr (U(t; a)  ~u0)  G((U(t; a)). This immediately gives us a rst result.
Lemma 1 In any contract accepted by the agent, she receives an ex ante rent; i.e. whenever (3.2)
is satised, U(t; a) > ~u0 for any realization of u0, except on a set of measure 0.
The proof is immediate and therefore omitted. Lemma 1 informs us that the agent's participation
cannot bind. With this Problem 1 rewrites as:-
Problem 2
max
t;a
G((U(t; a)))
Z
Q
[x  t(x)] dF (xja)
s.t.
@U(t; a)
@a

Z
Q
u(t(x))dFa(xja)  c0(a) = 0; 8U(t; a)  ~u0 (3.3)
Let (t; a)  RQ [x  t(x)] dF (xja) and U = U(t; a) for ease of notation. Attach multiplier 
to (3.3). A solution to this problem must satisfy the rst-order conditions:-
1
u0(t)
=
g(U)
G(U)
(t; a) + 
fa(qja)
f(qja) (3.4)
and Z
Q
[x  t(x)] dFa(xja) + 
Z
Q
u(t(x))dFaa(xja)  c00(a)

= 0 (3.5)
by application of the Envelop Theorem (i.e. (3.3) holds). Let t solve (3.4) and a be a solu-
tion to (3.5); let them induce U(t; a) = U and denote by u0 the value of u0 for the marginal
participating agent. I make three claims about these conditions. First,
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Lemma 2 At a solution of Problem 2 the principal is eort constrained, i.e. the multiplier  is
strictly positive.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is that the transfer function t(q) is increasing, concave in
q as in the standard contract thanks to the MLRP. Second,
Lemma 3 Conditions (3.4) and (3.5) are (necessary and) sucient to identify a solution of Prob-
lem 2.
and third,
Lemma 4 U > u0.
This last Lemma essentially asserts that the optimal contract does not induce a trivial solution.
That is, the transfer t(q) is bounded according to (3.4), some eort is exerted in that a > min a
by (3.5) and a positive measure G(U) of agents may participate.
Condition (3.4) departs in an obvious way from the standard rst-order conditions characterizing
tSB in Problem 1. The term g(U)G(U)(t; a) appears in lieu of the standard Lagrange multiplier.
Condition (3.5) is thus also altered, however indirectly through the transfer t, which enters the
rst-order condition (3.5) and therefore determines the optimal action a. In the spirit of Laont
and Tirole (1986), this contract can be called \conditionally second-best": the action is not directly
distorted, but the transfer is { with consequences on the equilibrium action.3
We will return to the interpretation of these conditions. For now I note that the hazard rate
g=G appears. With this in mind,
Proposition 1 The threshold U is unique. For all u0  U the agent participates, while she does
not if u0 > U
.
In the rst-order condition (3.4), the hazard rate g(U)=G(U) exactly identies the rent U that
denes the participation threshold. This truncated density multiplies the principal's expected
prot. That is, a marginal increase in the agent's rent increases the probability of acceptance, in
which case the principal receives (t; a). Indeed g(U
)
G(U)(t; a) is the marginal benet of increasing
t to secure the agent's participation. Importantly, Condition (3.4) tells us that the participation
3In that paper, the eort is \conditionally rst-best" but the allocation is distorted to solve an adverse selection
problem.
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t(t; a)
Figure 1: objective functions. Problem 1 (left) and Problem 2 (right)
t
G()(t; a)
cost is not dened in terms of the outside option u0, as it is in Problem 1; that outside option
is unknown.4 Rather the cost of participation is determined in terms of the principal's marginal
benet of securing participation. In this model the participation problem induces a rent extraction-
participation trade-o between securing participation and oering excessive rents. This comes
about because not assuming that u0 is known drastically modies the principal's objective function.
In Problem 1 it is monotonically decreasing in t (for a xed action a); in contrast, in Problem 2 it
is non-monotonic and concave in t { hence the trade-o.5
3.3 Properties of the optimal contract
Lemmata 1, 3 and 4 and the rst-order condition (3.4) already inform us that the optimal contract
entails some distortion away from the standard second best. Because there are (ex ante) rents
(by Lemma 1), the transfer is necessarily \too high" as compared to that of the standard problem
(where the participation constraint binds). The solution a of Condition (3.5) is therefore also
distorted, even if only indirectly, compared to aSB. I want to formalize these ideas.
First it can be easily shown that the principal overpays the agent for any given action, as
compared to the standard problem (Problem 1).
Lemma 5 Fix the action a. For any realization u0  u0; 8q; t(q) > tSB(q).
In light of Lemma 1 this result may not be surprising; that is, overpaying the agent contributes to
4Recall that in Problem 1 Constraint (3.2) has a multiplier (u0) > 0, which is its shadow cost.
5Pointwise dierentiation of the objective function yields [g(U)=G(U)] u0  (t; a)  1. Dierentiating again yields
a negative expression by log-concavity of G and concavity of u(t).
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generating the rent U identied in Lemma 1. But it is not the only channel through which rents
may be created: the action may also be chosen so as to leave the agent with a rent. Thus Lemma 5
does identify the source of the rent as being a more generous transfer for any given action. The
fundamental reason is that the principal's problem is quite dierent when the outside option is
stochastic, as previously discussed. Lemma 5 also implies that participation is more costly to the
principal with a random outside option than in Problem 1. To see why, x a, multiply both sides
of the FOC (3.4) by f(qja) and integrate over Q to nd:-
Eq

1
u0(t)

=
g
G
(t; a)
Similarly with the standard FOC of Problem 1:-
Eq

1
u0(tSB)

= 
so t(q) > tSB(q) 8q ) gG(t; a) > , i.e. the cost of participation is larger for a given action.
Given that he overpays (for any xed action a), the principal has incentives to implement some
distortion to further limit the rent U left to the agent, but is unable to. The reason is that, no
matter how one may go about it, further rent extraction necessarily implies eort distortion, but
that decision is not the principal's to make. To see where these incentives stem from, by Lemma 4
the expected cost of the contract is
T 
Z u0
u0
Z
Q
t(x; z)dF (xja)dG(z) (3.6)
Now let
t(a;u0) 
Z
Q
t(x;u0)dF (xja)
Because t(q;u0) is increasing, concave in q, we know from Conlon (2008, Lemma 1) that t(a;u0) is
non-decreasing, concave in a. Therefore (3.6) rewrites
T (a) 
Z u0
u0
t(a; z)dG(z) (3.7)
which is an increasing function of a. So reducing the principal's expected cost requires the eort
to drop. However the principal is in no position to impose an eort distortion: unlike in a problem
of adverse selection, he does not choose the allocation. Rather, given a contract, the agent does {
through her action a. This is subgame-perfection at work, which is captured by the application of
the Envelop Theorem when deriving (3.5) { i.e. given any t; @U(t; a)=@a = 0.
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L(aSB)
aSBa a
L(a)
Figure 2: the principal's rst-order condition (3.5).
L(a)
Lemma 5 takes the action a as xed; of course it is endogenous too. The next Proposition
presents a cross-model comparison of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Fix the economy Q; F (qj); c();U0; G(u0). For any contract that the agent accepts
under random participation,
1. the eort is lower than in the standard problem; and
2. the transfer function t(q) lies everywhere (in Q) below the second-best tSB(q);
i.e. 8~u0  u0; a < aSB and t(q) < tSB(q) 8q 2 Q.
Facing a higher cost for any given action (Lemma 5) the principal necessarily prefers a lower action
than the second-best. This is shown in Figure 2. This in turns moderates the expected cost T (a).
To see why, consider an exogenous increase in the transfer; dierentiate (3.5) with respect to t:
 
Z
Q
dFa + 
Z
Q
u0dFaa + SOC
da
dt
+
d
dt
Z
Q
[x  t(x)] dFa + 
Z
Q
u(t(x))dFaa   c00

= 0
where SOC is the second-order condition of (3.5). The last term is zero, therefore dadt < 0 from the
perspective of the principal. In turn this adjustment has implications the agent: oering a transfer
that induces her to decrease her action below aSB not only decreases the agent's expected utility
by rst-order stochastic dominance, it also increases the risk.6 Proposition 2 paves the way for a
reasonably intuitive Corollary.
6MLRP implies rst-order stochastic dominance, as noted earlier, which is sucient for second-order stochastic
dominance. Hence the distribution F (qja) is more risky than F (qjaSB).
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Corollary 1 Take some u0 2 U0 such that USB = u0; u0 < u0
In other words, a further consequence of a stochastic outside option is that the participation
probability is lower than it would be under the second-best contract. The reason for a decrease
in participation between these two contracts is quite simple: a lower action always decreases the
rent U(a)  RQ u(t(x))dF (xja)   c(a) of the agent (even across models here). Therefore the
participation condition (3.2) becomes more dicult to satisfy.
Together Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 speak to the extent of the interaction between the
random nature of the outside option and the endogenous variables of the contract. The important
implication of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 is that moving from a deterministic to a stochastic
reservation utility has twofold consequences on welfare. First the optimal action is lower; second
the probability that a welfare-enhancing relationship is entered into, decreases.
3.4 Comparative statics
This model aords the opportunity to perform an interesting comparative statics exercise on two
exogenous elements: the distribution F (qja) (as well as the agent's risk aversion), and the dis-
tribution G(u0), which summarizes the contracting environment. Namely I want to understand
how changes in F (qja) (or the utility function u()) aect the participation threshold u0, which is
governed by G(u0). Conversely, I am interested in understanding how changes in the environment,
described by properties of the distribution of u0, interact with the moral hazard problem. These
are the object of the next two Propositions.
Proposition 3 The transfer t, the optimal action a and participation (i.e. G(U)) all decrease
in the dispersion of the distribution F (qja) and in the agent's risk-aversion.
That t and a decrease with dispersion and risk aversion is not puzzling. The third claim is less
obvious. Note that U(a) is decreasing in both dispersion of F (qja) and risk aversion.7 Therefore
the hazard rate g(U)=G(U) increases, which contributes to increasing t by (3.4). However this
need to secure participation (by raising t) is dominated by the incentive problem: any q becomes
a less informative signal of the agent's eort when F (qja) is more dispersed.
7This diers from Corollary 1 and its commentary. There I compare participation probabilities across models;
here I consider the contract under random outside option only and let the distribution F (qja) vary exogenously.
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Proposition 3 considers the impact of the agent's incentive problem on participation. The next
set of results operate dierently: starting from changes in the outside option, which is exogenous
to the agent's behavior (i.e. to solving (3.3)), I ask what it implies for the principal's choices. Of
course the principal's contract oer, which depends on G(u0), ultimately aects the agent's action.
Proposition 4 Take two distributions G1(u0) and G
2(u0).
1. Suppose that G1 rst-order stochastically dominates G2; the action a solving (3.5) and
participation (i.e. G(U(a; u0))) are both lower under G1 than G2.
2. Suppose that G2 is a single mean-preserving spread of G1, and let u00 denote the realization
such that G2(u00) = G1(u00). When u0 < u00 the action a solving (3.5) and participation are
both lower under G1 than G2. Conversely when u0 > u00.
If recalling Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, the second claim follows intuitively: take a perfectly
known outside option and introduce a little uncertainty around it, Proposition 2 suggests that
eort decreases and Corollary 1 that participation drops. Proposition 4 formalizes this insight.
Both these claims rely on the behavior of the hazard rate g=G. To gain some intuition, recall
the rst-order condition (3.4) where, ceteris paribus, the transfer increases in the hazard rate; this
corresponds to a smaller G. Therefore the cost of a given action is higher under G1 than G2. The
dierence between the two claims of Proposition 4 is this: under rst-order stochastic dominance
G1  G2 everywhere, so the ordering of the hazard rates never changes. This is not true under a
mean-preserving spread. At u00 the ordering of the distributions changes and so does that of the
hazard rates. The transfer decreases because its marginal impact on the participation decision is
low: when u0 > u00, participation is already secured for most realisations of the outside option.8
3.5 Menus of contracts
Faced with some hidden information one may wonder whether the principal could not do better
by using menus to screen the agent's outside option u0 (her type). It turns out that menus cannot
make the principal better o in this model. Suppose he uses a direct revelation mechanism to elicit
the agent's private information of the form ht(q;u0); a(u0)i. Given a message u0, that contract
8The restriction to single mean-preserving spread is for convenience only; then G1 and G2 cross only once.
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is the standard second-best contract corresponding to Problem 1. We know from the standard
rst-order condition 1=u0 = (u0)+SBfa=f that t(q; ~u0) 6= t(q; u^0) for ~u0 6= u^0. From (3.1) it then
follows that a(~u0) 6= a(u^0). Now consider a truth-telling constraint
U (t(; ~u0); a(~u0); ~u0; ~u0)  U (t(; u^0); a(u^0); u^0; ~u0) ; 8 ~u0; u^0 (3.8)
when the agent is of type ~u0 but may report some u^0. This condition is equivalent to saying that
the agent solves
u^0 2 arg max
u02U0
U (t(; u^0); a(u^0); u^0; ~u0) ;
or, dierentiating at u^0 = ~u0, means
@U
@t
@t
@u0
j~u0 +
@U
@a
@a
@u0
j~u0 = 0 (3.9)
By (3.3), @U@a = 0 and by monotonicity of u(); @U@t > 0. Therefore truthful revelation requires
@t
@u0
j~u0 = 0: there can be no discrimination on the basis of the outside option. But then eliciting
that information is useless. Thus we have
Proposition 5 A menu of contracts contingent on the agent's outside option cannot do better than
the (single) non-linear contract given by (3.4) and (3.5).
Why this result? Unlike in a standard screening model, here the agent takes an action a^ given
t(q;u0) after sending a message u^0. That action is necessarily optimal; this is subgame perfection
at work, and the second term of (3.9). Moreover, the single-crossing property does not hold { this
is the rst term of (3.9).9 The reason is that there is no direct connection between the agent's type
(her outside option u0) and her marginal utility of q.
10Hence all types pool. Proposition 5 leads to
an immediate Corollary.
Corollary 2 A participation fee cannot be used to extract the agent's rent.
for which the proof is evident and therefore omitted. Relying on the agent's message to set a
participation fee is impossible by Proposition 5. At the same time, charging a(n) (expected)
participation fee based on the measure of participating agents
R u0
u0
dG(z) would precisely deter the
marginal agent(s).
9The single-crossing condition is lost in a broad sense: the game is not even supermodular.
10Of course, Propositions 2-4 make clear some connection does exist, but it is indirect ; i.e. through the transfer t
and the FOC (3.5).
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Remark 1 An alternative timing may be to let the agent decide whether to accept the contract
before she knows her outside option. In an adverse selection context, this is known as ex ante
contracting. It is easy to see that the standard solution prevails, where u0 is replaced by E[u0] and
   (E[u0]) ;    (E[u0]).
4 Discussion
4.1 The linear model
The CARA-normal-linear framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) has proven to be a very
useful model for much applied work. In a dynamic environment, the linear contract has also been
shown to be optimal { under some restrictions (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)). In this section it
is shown that the linear model oers insights about the impact of randomness of the outside option
that do not extend to a more general setting.
Let t = +q be the tari oered, c(a) = (c=2)a2 and u =  er(t c(a)), where r is the coecient
of risk aversion. Let also q  N (0; 2). We know that the agent's problem upon accepting the
contract (i.e. (3.3)) is unchanged, so that the principal's program can be directly written
Problem 3
max
;
G

 e r[+2=2c (r=2)22]

c
 

+
2
c

Some optimization and simple algebra leads to the standard solution for the slope:  = 1=(1+rc2).
Because the slope of the ane contract in unchanged, the agent's optimal action is unaected and
remains as in the second-best problem. In this model therefore the stochastic nature of the outside
option has no consequences on incentives, and therefore on welfare.
This outcome is a feature of the exponential specication. The term  is independent of u0,
which is not true according to the standard condition 1=u0 =  + SBfa=f of Problem 1 (since
  (u0) in particular, and even less when g=G enters the FOC (3.4) directly). The reason is
that in the Holmstrom-Milgrom model (1987), the agent's optimal action dened as a = =c is
independent of level of utility, unlike in (3.1) or (3.3). Consequently, the rate of substitution of
the principal between instruments  and  is also independent of level of utility. Indeed, take the
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rst-order conditions of the standard linear-CARA-normal problem
 1 + re r[] = 0
1
c
  2
c

+ re r[]

c
  r2

= 0
Re-arranging and dividing one by the other gives the \marginal rate of substitution" between 
and  , which is independent of e r[]. In consumer theory this leads to corner solutions. The
\corner solution" here is to always increase  to satisfy participation, while  remains unchanged.
In other words, the exponential utility does not just \abstract from wealth eects" (as noted by
Holmstrom and Milgrom); there is complete, but somewhat articial, separability of the instruments
available to the principal. A similar property can be veried when the outside option is random;
 never changes while  adjusts to solve the participation problem as in Problem 2. Then the
comparative statics of Proposition 3 all carry over, where dispersion is measured by the variance
but Proposition 4 no longer follows in it entirety as eort does not change.
To further the insight into the limitations of the CARA-linear-normal model regardless of
whether the outside option is random, consider the following simple example. Take a linear contract
t =  + q, an eort cost c(a) = a2=2, a simple two-outcome space: q 2 f0; 1g with a distribution
Pr(q = 1) = a and an arbitrary utility function u(), increasing and concave. The agent's payo is
au(+ ) + (1  a)u()  a
2
2
so that the maximizer is a^ = u(+ )  u(). Internalizing this, the principal's payo reads
a^(1    )  (1  a^);
which is maximized when   () = 1   u(+) u()u0(+) . The optimal slope is a function of the
intercept. The implication is this: with any other functional form than exponential utility, the
intercept does aect the determination of the slope parameter, which governs incentives. So, the
participation constraint is not neutral on incentives. With a stochastic outside option, participation
is more costly to ensure, with now well understood consequences on the provision of incentives.
4.2 Risk aversion of the principal
One may conjecture that a risk-averse principal may want to increase the transfer function t even
further (for any q) in order to secure the agent's participation. When the principal is risk-averse
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the contract diers from the scheme characterized by (3.4) and (3.5) only to the extent of risk
aversion. Indeed, let the principal have payos w(q  t) with w() increasing and concave, the rst
order conditions now read:-
w0(q   t)
u0(t)
=
g(U)
G(U)
(t; a) + 
fa(qja)
f(qja) (4.1)
and Z
Q
w(x  t(x))dFa(xja) + 
Z
Q
u(t(x))dFaa(xja)  c00(a) = 0 (4.2)
The interpretation of (4.1) does not depart much from that of (3.4), but is quite illustrative: a
very risk-averse principal wants at least some output; he will oer a at transfer that secures
participation and needs not induce high eort.
4.3 Connection to Adverse Selection
Bar for the appearance of the hazard rate g(U)=G(U) in the rst-order condition (3.4), the results
of this paper bear little resemblance to those of Rochet and Stole (2000). This should come as
little surprise in that adverse selection and moral hazard are quite dierent problems. It is worth
mentioning however that Rochet and Stole (2000) show that the introduction of a random outside
option reduces distortions (i.e. is welfare improving, most notably at the lower bound of the type
space). In contrast I nd that a random outside option enhances distortions (i.e. decreases welfare).
The ultimate reason for this essential dierence resides in the fundamentally dierent nature of
the agent's informational rents. In the adverse selection model the information rent exists regardless
of the stochastic nature of the outside option. The principal pays that rent with probability
G(U) < 1: randomness decreases the expected rent paid out. Reducing the distortion, which
is costly to the principal, is thus inexpensive, as well as eective, to increase the probability of
acceptance. Under moral hazard instead, the randomness of the outside option introduces a new
informational rent that the principal can control only imperfectly using the transfer; no direct
distortion of the allocation{here the action{is possible (recall (3.5)). More obviously, randomness
of the outside option increases the expected cost T (a) of any action. Hence the principal's preferred
action can only be lower than the second-best.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of moral hazard when the agent's reservation utility is uncertain. The
introduction of a random outside option has real implications for the optimal contract. Secur-
ing participation becomes an issue for the principal, in addition to addressing the moral hazard
problem; this introduces a new trade-o between rent extraction and participation. The optimal
transfer reects these twin concerns, and is costlier. This has consequences on his ability to provide
incentives for eort: given a higher cost, the prescribed action is necessarily lower. Thus private
information held by the agent about her outside option leads to a socially worse outcome. The
welfare losses are in fact twofold: the principal prescribes a lower action, the consequence of which
is a lower participation probability. This stands in contrast to the case of adverse selection, where
that same private information is welfare enhancing in that distortions are reduced.
Any participating agent receives an ex ante rent in this model. One may thus interpret random-
ness of the outside option as akin to conferring some bargaining power to the agent. This would
not be faithful to the details of the game; here the principal still makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer
to the agent. In doing so however he is less informed than in the standard problem and thus faces
the trade-o we now know.
Describing the outside option as a random variable can be conceived of as a reduced form for
a market game, in which principals compete by posting contract and agents make participation
and eort decisions. The current results lead me to conjecture that agents will receive rents and
that contracts will display weaker incentives (than the second-best). While economists think of
competition as being socially benecial because it removes distortions, the present paper suggests
the details of the competitive process and the contracting game are essential in achieving allocative
eciency. Furthermore, if the outside option u0 is generated by oers from competing principals of
varying quality (modeled for example as dierent supports Q, or dierent transformations of q), the
result herein seem to imply that lower-quality principals would only be able to induce lower eort
than high types. That is, the moral hazard problem may amplify the dierences in the principals'
underlying abilities. The details of these questions are left for future research.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: Taking the FOC of the Lagrangean formed by the objective function and the
constraint (3.3) is straightforward and therefore omitted. Both (3.4) and (3.5) arise by application
of the Envelop Theorem (i.e. (3.3) holds). To show that  > 0 I apply the proof of Jewitt (1988)
to Conditions (3.4) and (3.3). Rewrite fa = (1=u
0   [g(U)=G(U)](t; a)) f(qja)= from (3.4) and
substitute in (3.3): Z
Q
u(t(x))

1
u0
  g(U)
G(U)
(t; a)

dF (xja) = c0(a)
Integrate (3.4) over Q : Eq[1=u0] =
R
Q[g(U)=G(U)](t; a)dF = [g(U)=G(U)]
R
Q (t; a)dF =
[g(U)=G(U)](t; a) by the Law of Iterated Expectations. ThereforeZ
Q
u(t(x))

1
u0
  Eq

1
u0

dF (xja) = c0(a) > 0
so  > 0 as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 3: Necessity is immediate. To show suciency, recall that G() is log-
concave (lnG() is concave), so that g()=G() > 0 and @@u0 (g()=G()) < 0. The term (t; a) is
clearly decreasing in t. For a xed a the last term of (3.4) is independent of t, so the RHS of
that condition decreases in t while the LHS increases. Hence t is unique, given some xed a. We
already know that (3.5) is sucient from the standard problem under the conditions of the FOA.
Proof of Lemma 4: Rewrite (3.4) as
g(U)
G(U)
Z
Q
u0(t(x))dF (xja)(t; a) + 
Z
Q
u0(t(x))dFa(xja) = 1
where 
R
Q u
0(t(x))dFa(xja) and
R
Q u
0(t(x))dF (xja)(t; a) are all well dened and bounded. There-
fore the ratio g(U)=G(U) is also bounded, and U(t; a) > u0.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose t(q) < tSB(q) 8q and consider a realization u0 < u0. With a
xed,
c(a) 
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja) <
Z
Q
u(tSB(x))dF (xja) = c(aSB)
which contradicts the premise that a = aSB (i.e. a is xed). Conversely, with t(q) > tSB(q) 8qZ
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja) >
Z
Q
u(tSB(x))dF (xja) = c(aSB) = c(a)
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as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 1: Uniqueness of U follows directly from the fact that (3.4) and (3.5)
are necessary and sucient. The rest of the claim follows from the denition of the hazard rate
g(u0)=G(u0).
Proof of Proposition 2: Let L(a)  RQ [x  t(x)] dFa(xja)+ hRQ u(t(x))dFaa(xja)  c00(a)i
for some transfer function t. The rst-order condition dening a is given by L(a) = 0 and
L0(a)  0 (strictly here thanks to the FOA assumptions).
Suppose that the contract ht; ai is such that a  aSB. Now a  aSB only if L(a)  L(aSB)
at aSB. Recalling that Z
Q
t(x)dF (xja)  t(a);
it then follows from Lemma 5 that t(a) > tSB(a) for any given a, and therefore that L(a) <
LSB(a) 8a (by simple substitution of t(a) in L(a)). Hence the starting premise is incorrect: there
cannot be a contract ht; ai is such that a  aSB. Therefore a < aSB. We know that t(a) in
increasing and concave (for t(q) is increasing, concave in q (Lemma 1 in Conlon, 2008)). It then
follows that
Eq [t(q)]  t(a) < Eq

tSB(q)
  t(aSB):
To show that t(q) lies every where below tSB(q), I call on the monotonicity of t(a); therefore there
exists a function  such that
t(q)  (t(a))
where  is increasing. Because a < aSB; t(a) < t(aSB) so that
t(q)  (t(a)) < tSB(q)  (t(aSB)):
Proof of Corollary 1: Let a0 solve (3.1) (the agent's rst-order condition in the standard
problem). Now observe that because a = a^ < aSB = a0,Z
Q
u(t(x))dFa(xja^) <
Z
Q
u(tSB(x))dFa(xjaSB) (6.1)
necessarily from the agent's rst-order condition. Also, F (qjaSB) FOSD F (qja). It is therefore
also true that F (qjaSB) SOSD F (qja). Dene the variable q = qSB + , where q  F (qja) and
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qSB  F (qjaSB) (so q is more risky than qSB). Consider again (3.1), as under F (qjaSB), and
dierentiate with respect to  at  = 0:Z
Q
u(t(x))dFaa   c00(a)

da0
d
+
d
d
Z
Q
u(t(x))dFa = 0
The last term is equivalent to (6.1) so it is negative. The bracketed one is the agent's second-order
condition; it also negative. Therefore da
0
d < 0 necessarily and so is the reciprocal. Last, take U(a)
and dierentiate with respect to a:
dU(a; u0)
da
=
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja)  c0(a)

+
d
da
@
@
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja) > 0
where the rst term is zero by (3.3) and the partial derivative necessarily negative by SOSD. So as
the action decreases, so does the rent U(a). Because the marginal participating agent is identied
by U(a; u0) = u0 and the measure of participating agents is G(U), the latter necessarily decreases
as  increases.
Proof of Proposition 3: First let a^ solve the agent's moral hazard constraint (3.3). In
equilibrium, a^ = a. Dierentiate (3.3) with respect to t:Z
Q
u0dFa(xja) +
Z
Q
u(t(x))dFaa(xja)  c00(a)

da^
dt
= 0 (6.2)
Since the term in the brackets is the agent's second-order condition, it is negative. Therefore da^dt > 0.
To prove the rst set of claims, consider two distributions F 1(qja) and F 2(qja), where F 2 is a
mean-preserving spread of F 1 (see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). Fix t; because F 1 dominates F 2
in the second order sense, it follows from (3.3) that at a^Z
Q
u(t(x))dF 2a (xja) <
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF 1a (xja) (6.3)
from (6.1). Dene the variable q2 = q1+ , where q2  F 2 and q1  F 1 (so q2 is more risky than q1,
and (6.3) follows). Consider again (3.3), as under F 1, and dierentiate with respect to  at  = 0:Z
Q
u(t(x))dF 1aa(xja)  c00(a)

da^
d
+
d
d
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF 1a = 0
By (6.3) the last term is negative, so da^d < 0. Letting
da^
d  da^dt dtd and using da^dt < 0; dtd < 0 as
claimed. To show that participation decreases, take U(a) and dierentiate with respect to :
dU(a; u0)
d
=
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja)  c0(a)

da
d
+
@
@
Z
Q
u(t(x))dF (xja) < 0
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where the rst term is zero by (3.3) and the second one necessarily negative by SOSD. Because the
marginal participating agent is identied by U(a; u0) = u0 and the measure of participating agents
is G(U), the latter necessarily decreases as  increases.
To show the impact of a change in risk aversion, consider a family of utility functions u(t; r)
parametrized by r; risk aversion (i.e. the concavity of u(; )) increases in r. Suppose for simplicity
that u(t; r) is continuous and dierentiable in r (as well as t). For a xed contract C, we know that
d
dr
Z
Q
u(t(x); r)dF (xja) < 0:
That is, equivalently, for any two r2 > r1;
R
Q u(t; r2)dF (xja) <
R
Q u(t; r1)dF (xja). It then follows
from (3.3) that a(r2) < a(r1); equivalently, dierentiating (3.3)
d
dr
Z
Q
u(t; r)dFa(xja) + da
dr
Z
Q
u(t; r)dFaa(xja)  c00(a)

= 0 (6.4)
Because the rst term of (6.4) is negative it follows that dadr < 0 as well. Making use of the fact
that dadt > 0 completes the argument. To extend the result to the measure of participating agents
G(u0) simply apply the same argument as for the SOSD claim.
Proof of Proposition 4: Because G1 FOSD G2; G1  G2 8u0 2 U0 (strictly for at least
a positive-measure subset of U0) and ln(G1)  ln(G2) as well. Therefore by log-concavity of
Gi; g1=G1 > g2=G2. Immediately from the rst-order condition (3.4) we must have t1 solving it
under G1 larger than t2 solving (3.4) under G2 (for a xed action). Therefore a1 solving (3.5) under
G1 must be lower than a2 solving (3.5) under G2. By application of the proof of Proposition 3
(above), participation is therefore lower { i.e. because a = a^; F (qja2) FOSD F (qja1), which is
sucient for SOSD as well. To show the second claim, let G2 be a mean-preserving spread of G1
and let u00 denote the value of the random variable such that G2(u00) = G1(u00). Therefore
G1(u0) < G
2(u0); u0 < u
0
0
G1(u0) > G
2(u0); u0 > u
0
0
By log-concavity of Gi, it then follows that
g1=G1 > g2=G2; u0 < u
0
0
g1=G1 < g2=G2; u0 > u
0
0
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and that t solving (3.4) is higher (lower) when ~u0 < u00 (~u0 > u00). Therefore a solving (3.5) is
lower (higher) when ~u0 < u
0
0 (~u0 > u
0
0). When a
 is lower (higher), participation is lower (higher),
by application of the proof of Proposition 3.
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